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Guidance (DSG)-a term that will be used throughout as a reference to Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense.
Methodology
This paper is organized into five major sections. Upon completion of the introduction, the author will review the DSG and the associated United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) posture statement. That review will be used to distill five implications for AFSOC. The author will then examine AFSOC's current approach toward negotiating the challenges associated with those implications. The paper will conclude with the presentation of two recommendations for AFSOC to consider as it looks to the future.
America's New Strategic Direction
The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance President Obama, Secretary Panetta, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed the DSG at a press conference in the Pentagon on January 5, 2012. The guidance followed a comprehensive defense review initiated by President Obama in response to the "winding down" of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the "rising threat from China and Iran," and the "fiscal crisis demanding hundreds of billions of dollars in Pentagon budget cuts." 3 During press conference remarks, the President stated the new strategy provides "well-defined goals", clarifies America's "strategic interests in a fast-changing world," and guides "our defense priorities and spending over the coming decade." 4 In the preface to Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, President Obama identifies the need to "focus on a broader range of challenges and opportunities, including the security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific." 5 Secretary Panetta asserts the US is "at a strategic turning point" and reaffirms the notion the Joint Force "will have a global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific." 6 In implementing the DSG, Pentagon officials established the priority of maintaining the vitality of America's special operations forces (SOF). 7 Whereas the DSG compels the majority of the Department of Defense to shift from "an emphasis on today's wars to preparing for future challenges," SOF must be able to do both simultaneously-prevail in "today's wars" while adequately preparing for the future. 
USSOCOM Posture Statement
In his statement before Congress, Admiral McRaven reassured members that SOF are "well-suited to respond" to the "rapidly changing environment" described in the DSG. 9 He suggested his command will "remain engaged against violent extremist networks for the foreseeable future" during which SOF's core capability of direct action will be required as a means for disrupting those threats. 10 He made it a point of emphasis, however, to assert the importance of the indirect approach as a necessary complement to direct action. The first implication to be discussed is an increased demand for forward engagement.
Increased Building Partner Capacity Missions
As part of the call for increased forward engagement, AFSOC should expect to face additional tasking for aviation foreign internal defense (AvFID) and building partner forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance." 29 Throughout its existence, USSOCOM has been charged with building the military and security capacity of our nation's partners. Indeed, the command describes this activity as one of its core operations. 30 Furthermore, three of SOF's eleven specified missions "directly support" BPC efforts. 31 Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is one of those specified missions. A recent US Army War College research paper provides an easily understandable definition of FID-"training and equipping host-nation military" forces "to promote stability and liaisons." 32 Within AFSOC, it is the mission of the 6th Special
Operations Squadron (SOS) to conduct FID.
The 6th SOS is the primary unit within AFSOC responsible for conducting BPC operations. The squadron's mission is "to assess, train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment and force integration." 33 Airmen in the squadron are regionally oriented and proficient in a variety of foreign languages; they come from 32 career fields and undergo an extensive assessment, selection, and 8 training regimen before they graduate as air advisors. 34 Organized into theater-oriented operational detachments, air advisors' primary objective is "facilitating the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of participating foreign aviation resources supporting joint and combined operations." 35 As one of only three squadrons in the USAF that perform the air advisory mission, members of the 6th SOS provide a significant contribution to our nation's ongoing BPC efforts in the air domain.
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According to a 2008 report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), "Airpower is a major source of American advantage in foreign internal defense." 37 Despite its importance, AFSOC is only one of two major commands in the USAF specifically tasked to conduct AvFID. 38 Even without the renewed focus on BPC provided by the DSG, the supply of AvFID could not meet the latent demand. The CSBA report concludes, "at least 58 percent of the formal requests for forces received by the squadron [6th SOS] were unsupportable, primarily owing to a lack of manpower, and hundreds of additional informal requests were not met." 39 Efforts are ongoing to double the personnel numbers in an attempt to increase capacity, but the CSBA report asserts "as much as five times" the current capacity could be required to meet estimated demand. 40 In order to meet the intent of the DSG, AFSOC should recalibrate and redirect its current capacity for AvFID.
The most recent publically available unclassified data claims there was a Increased Engagement in the Asia-Pacific
The DSG unequivocally calls for rebalancing America's strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region. Re-emphasizing the region, the strategy is "intended to offer more than just increased force levels and rhetoric," according to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey. 43 The strategy will require "more personnel for military-to-military engagements to strengthen existing relationships and build trust among emerging partners in the region." 44 A Congressional Research Service report on the DSG suggests one purpose for the "pivot" is to "deepen U.S. credibility in the region at a time of fiscal constraint." 45 The renewed focus also underscores President Obama's belief that "the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests is shifting towards Asia, and that U.S. strategy and priorities need to be adjusted accordingly." 46 In contrast to the President's assertion, the bulk of AFSOC's force lay down and forward presence is in regions other than the Asia-Pacific.
AFSOC has one group permanently based in the Asia-Pacific. It is the 353rd
Special Operations Group (SOG) at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, Japan. The group has three operational squadrons-two flying squadrons and one special tactics squadron; other units within the group support the operations of these three squadrons.
AFSOC units also comprise the aviation arm of the Joint Special Operations Task Force
Philippines (JSOTF-P) on a rotational basis. Detachments from AFSOC's CONUS-based ISR, intra-theater airlift, and AvFID squadrons, along with elements from the 353rd SOG, support the JSOTF-P. In citing the success of the JSOTF-P, General
Dempsey suggests joint task forces that "work through local partners" and that are "committed over time" will be an integral part of future Pacific engagements. 47 Additional future deployments in the region will require "increased flexibility" and "will be smaller, more agile, expeditionary, self-sustaining, and self-contained." 48 As deployments increase, personnel readiness becomes more of a challenge within AFSOC's ranks-relationships fail, medical conditions become debilitating, and retention becomes difficult. Instead of offering a respite from these challenges, it is likely the DSG will continue to increase stress on AFSOC's force. To mitigate the effects on personnel and mission readiness, AFSOC should expect to expend additional fiscal resources on boosting personal resiliency and equipment life-cycle longevity.
Budgetary Concerns
Promoting resiliency in its all-volunteer force is one area that will require additional resources if the AFSOC operations tempo continues to remain high. Admiral
McRaven, however, seems to stand firmly behind such initiatives even in this era of fierce resource competition. Resiliency efforts will come at the expense of other DOD programs as the military implements $487 billion in budget cuts over the next decade.
According to Secretary Panetta, one of the main purposes of the DSG is to "help shape the force of the 21 st century . . . even in an era of constrained resources." 58 In his speech at the National Press Club, Secretary Panetta said that he and military leaders want to avoid "across-the-board cuts that hollowed out the force and weakened our military" during past drawdowns. 59 Impending cuts will be substantial but targeted, influencing the relationship between the services, USSOCOM, and component commands such as AFSOC.
Even with the Budget Control Act and its associated cuts, Admiral McRaven projects SOF to grow 3-5% each year through FY 2017. 60 In many ways, this growth is 13 necessary to implement the DSG that seems to rely on SOF more heavily and in order to "reap a high rate of return" on the significant financial investment the nation has already made in SOF over the last decade (USSOCOM's budget has tripled since 2001). 61 Nevertheless, while USSOCOM grows, the services will decline-the Marines
Corps by 20,000 personnel and the Army by 80,000 soldiers. 62 A recent report from CSIS suggests that "behind closed doors SOF may find relations with the services increasingly strained" as the "services, under their own budget pressures, will likely demand that USSOCOM rely more on its SOF-specific funding source (MFP-11) and less on money directly from the military branches."
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USSOCOM has "service-like" responsibilities because it has its own checkbook and accompanying authority over SOF force structure and equipment. 64 It has its own Major Force Program (MFP-11) through which it develops "SOF specific" and "SOF peculiar" equipment. USSOCOM relies on the services to fund "service common capabilities". 65 To illustrate this relationship, consider the MC-130 aircraft: USSOCOM relies on the USAF to buy the basic C-130 airframe under MFP-4, but then modifies it to the MC-130 standard using MFP-11 funds. Shrinking service budgets will likely strain this funding and acquisition arrangement. Shrinking service budgets will also affect AFSOC in other ways besides in acquisitions and the funding of new equipment.
USSOCOM and its component commands rely significantly on conventional forces as key enablers for their operations. Enabling capabilities include communications, security, logistics, medical, mobility, and intelligence. 66 The former commander of USSOCOM, Admiral Eric T. Olsen, stressed the importance of this support to SOF operations in saying the "nonavailability of these force enablers has become the most vexing issue in the current operational environment, especially in view of the responsible general-purpose forces drawdown." 67 When forward deployed over a prolonged period, AFSOC substantially relies on such conventional support;
conventional force cutbacks, therefore, will negatively affect AFSOC's ability to project and sustain its forces in future forward engagement scenarios. To drive home the point, a CSIS report asserts that as personnel numbers shrink within the services, "fewer conventional units could reduce SOF's ability to conduct the range and depth of missions required in the new strategy" preserve the force and families; and responsive resourcing. 78 To achieve this vision, he advances three primary objectives: restructure AFSOF; improve platform capabilities;
and increase forward presence. 79 Restructure AFSOF AFSOC's first objective involves preserving the force, simplifying operational command and control, and building a "pure fleet" of primary airframes. 80 In a parallel effort to USSOCOM's Pressure on the Force initiative, Lieutenant General Fiel took proactive efforts to increase the resiliency of his Airmen. He drove the allocation of helpful resources down to lower echelons of command in an attempt to increase readiness, boost effectiveness, and improve retention. AFSOC Airmen now have access to chaplains, medical professionals, and social workers at the group or squadron level. This ongoing effort builds resilience for today's warriors and puts an effective structure in place to meet future stress on the force challenges.
To meet future fiscal challenges, AFSOC is pursuing the acquisition of a pure fleet of primary aircraft platforms. Maintenance commonalities and training synergies associated with pure fleets produce operational efficiencies that should result in savings during leaner budgetary years ahead. This initiative also modernizes the current fleet of aircraft thereby improving overall sustainability. The flagship of this program is the C-130J; using the C-130J as a basic airframe, the command will reduce the number of C-130 variants from eight to three. 81 This ongoing recapitalization and repurposing program will reduce the number of overall airframe types in the command from 15 to seven; AFSOC contends its overall capabilities will increase even though it is reducing platform types. 82 Improve Platform Capability
In improving capabilities, AFSOC intends to improve the overall lethality, survivability, agility, and adaptability of its air platforms. The Precision Strike Platform (PSP), operationally proven on the AC-130W, will continue to evolve and serve as the configurable baseline for future strike aircraft (such as the AC-130J). The PSP has proven itself both efficient and effective in combat operations over Afghanistan.
Similarly, AFSOC will reconfigure its Air National Guard EC-130J Commando Solo aircraft to improve agility and adaptability. Current equipment will be de-modified and replaced with flexible configurations-roll on/roll off packages tailored for Military
Information Support Operations. 83 Furthermore, AFSOC will make its SOF mobility assets more adaptable and agile through hardware commonalities and software specialization. Currently, specific missions are associated with specific airframes; in the future, airframes will be common with specialization occurring through the software programming of mission equipment interfaces. AFSOC will accomplish these initiatives through the application of existing technologies; additionally, the command will pursue advanced technologies through the acquisition of the next generation mobility aircraft. The command's plan appears to be multi-faceted. Major efforts include enhancing regional expertise and expanding the overseas groups to achieve a more persistent presence. and educated Airmen in subject areas including cultural/geopolitical regional orientation, foreign language specialization, and irregular warfare. 89 The activation of the AFSOAWC in February 2013 better organizes irregular warfare activities within AFSOC. 90 The new center incorporates the 6th SOS and its AvFID mission. The anticipated result is for AFSOC units to more effectively train for and execute BPC missions. The AFSOAWC will train airmen to perform advisory roles in competencies including air mobility, ISR/strike, medical, joint terminal air control, maintenance, logistics, force protection, communications, survival, and civil engineering.
The AFSOAWC will package forces of advisors and present enhanced BPC capabilities to the regional GCCs. 91 This reorganization (to include changes in mission, equipment, and personnel) will also increase the SOF intra-theater airlift capacity thereby allowing future AvFID detachments to better support joint partners in the field. The result should be a more focused, more persistent forward presence to support the indirect approach.
In addition to this indirect approach, AFSOC plans to increase forward presence 
